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RLUIPA AS A POSSIBLE SHIELD FROM THE
GOVERNMENT TAKING OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTY

Allison Scaduto ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two hundred thirty years ago, one commentator writing on burial rites observed that “there is perhaps nothing else so distinctive of
the condition and character of a people as the method in which they
1
treat their dead.” Today, this prudent revelation is being put to the
test. The preservation of cemeteries and other sacred burial sites is
often at odds with government ideals—namely the condemnation of
said land for public use under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
2
Despite their unique purpose in the community,
Amendment.
cemeteries and other land used by religious institutions are just as
susceptible to the government’s eminent domain power as are all
other forms of land. With the enactment of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA, or “the Act”)
comes the hope of a statutory shield against condemnation proceedings that affect religious burial sites and other religious uses of prop3
erty. As recent case law suggests, however, cemetery protection from
a government’s power of eminent domain under RLUIPA is tenuous
4
and problematic.
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Bowdoin College, 2002. I would like to extend a special thanks to Professor Rachel Godsil for her
invaluable guidance and assistance during the creation of this comment.
1
WILLIAM TEGG, THE LAST ACT: BEING THE FUNERAL RITES OF NATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS 9 (William Tegg ed., 1876).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc to -5 (2000). This comment focuses on the land use provisions of the Act, not
those pertaining to institutionalized persons.
4
Compare St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (declining to apply RLUIPA to municipal eminent domain actions), and Temple Faith
Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254–55 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (same),
with Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
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Congress enacted RLUIPA to give additional protection to private land used primarily for religious exercise, with the hopes of preventing government actions that impose a substantial burden on the
5
free exercise of religion. However, the Act was narrowly tailored to
govern only government actions that constitute “land use regula6
tion[s].” Whether an eminent domain proceeding is a land use
regulation under RLUIPA is the central question in the debate. An
affirmative answer to that question could be the decisive factor guaranteeing additional protection for religious institutions and their
chosen land uses. Conversely, if an eminent domain proceeding is
not considered a land use regulation within the scope of RLUIPA,
then religious institutions and cemetery preservationists will have little success using RLUIPA as a defense against the condemnation of
their sacred land. This Comment contends that eminent domain
proceedings are not per se land use regulations within the scope of
RLUIPA, but that an eminent domain proceeding might fall under
RLUIPA’s umbrella if undertaken as part of a plan to ultimately execute a land use regulation.
Part II traces the history of the Act and the current district court
debate over RLUIPA’s application to condemnation proceedings.
Part III analyzes whether an eminent domain proceeding is a land
use regulation within the scope of RLUIPA and evaluates the arguments on each side of that debate. Part IV explores the consequences of declaring that eminent domain is not a recognized land
use regulation protected under RLUIPA. Finally, Part V considers
the future of the Act’s relationship with eminent domain and the
current push to amending the Act to include eminent domain as a
per se land use regulation.
II. RLUIPA AND ST. JOHN’S UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
A look at the controversial history of RLUIPA will provide the
foundation for the current federal court debate over its application to
condemnation proceedings, as well as a useful backdrop for exploring the issue. The leading case in this debate is St. John’s United

1203, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying RLUIPA to municipal eminent domain action
in grant of preliminary injunction).
5
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). See generally 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27,
2000) (statements of Sens. Hatch, Kennedy, and Reid).
6
§ 2000cc(a)(1). See also 146 CONG. REC. S7779 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (referring to RLUIPA as “a narrowly-tailored religious freedom protection measure”).
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7

Church of Christ v. City of Chicago —decided in the Northern District of
Illinois in the wake of Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Development
8
Agency. With Supreme Court jurisprudence nonexistent and district
court analysis scarce, the discussion is just beginning.
A. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
RLUIPA is the product of a ten-year tug-of-war between the Supreme Court of the United States and Congress regarding the appropriate standard of review for government actions—specifically land
9
use regulations—that affect religious actors. The debate began with
10
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith that
religious actors are not automatically exempt from compliance with
11
“neutral, generally applicable regulatory law[s].” The Smith Court
proclaimed that it would no longer apply the Sherbert v. Verner balanc12
ing test, which was used since 1963 and allowed the government to
substantially burden religious exercise if such actions were “justified
13
by a compelling governmental interest.”
In direct response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
14
(RFRA). The purpose of RFRA was to reinstate the Sherbert compel15
ling interest test in place of the neutrality test prescribed in Smith.
The risk inherent in the regulation of religious land uses was that by
“controlling where churches may locate, governments control the
kind of mission they may pursue, and so risk forcing churches to con16
form to the community’s vision of the ‘proper’ church.” While the
17
legislature’s concerns were well substantiated, the Supreme Court
7

401 F. Supp. 2d 887.
218 F. Supp. 2d 1203.
9
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
10
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11
Id. at 880–81.
12
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
13
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
14
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -5 (2000).
In RFRA, Congress found that the Smith decision had “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion”—a clear indication that the legislation was intended as a
direct response to Smith. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 512 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to . . . Smith . . . .”).
15
§ 2000bb(b)(1).
16
Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 941 (2001).
17
See Angela C. Carmella & Eugene Gressman, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 67 (1996) (“Seldom has Congress been inspired to
8
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reacted in opposition to Congress. Five years later, the Supreme
18
Court ruled in City of Boerne v. Flores that RFRA was unconstitutional
because it exceeded Congress’s Enforcement Clause power under the
19
Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the Act’s widespread coverage of all federal, state, and
local government actions—regardless of the level of religious bigotry
motivating such actions—in conjunction with RFRA’s compelling interest test resulted in “RFRA’s impact [being] disproportionate to the
20
constitutional harms it was designed to prevent.” This disproportionality between the goals of the statute and the means used to reach
those goals indicated that RFRA was not enacted as a remedial or
21
preventative measure, but as a “substantive change in constitutional
22
protections.” Such action by Congress challenged vital separation
of powers principles. Never before had Congress enacted a statute
imposing on the judiciary an obligation to discount a Supreme Court
decision interpreting a constitutional provision and replacing it in23
stead with what Congress deemed a “better interpretive approach.”
Dating back to Marbury v. Madison, it has been “emphatically the
24
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
As a consequence, Congress lacked the power to enact RFRA—
legislation that invaded the judiciary’s jurisdiction and role in the
25
United States government. Thus, the Supreme Court struck down
26
RFRA in 1997.
After the failure of RFRA, Congress decided to forgo the Smith
27
neutrality approach, and responded by enacting RLUIPA. Aware of
its powers to enact legislation “to enforce and protect some specified

express such quick indignation and displeasure with a constitutional decision of the
Supreme Court or been so eager to overturn the substance of such a decision.”).
18
521 U.S. 507.
19
Id. at 536; see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 942.
20
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Carmella & Gressman, supra note 17.
24
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
25
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
26
Id. Justice Stevens, concurring, argued that the Act provided religious institutions with a weapon against the government that was not available to non-religious
institutions and therefore was in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 537
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 942.
27
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc to -5 (2000).
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28

aspects of religious exercise,” Congress deliberately created RLUIPA
to be more narrow than RFRA. RLUIPA applies only to governmental burdens that are imposed by or in the implementation of a land
29
use regulation, which the statute defines as:
a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law,
that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land
(including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an
ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire
such an interest. 30

RLUIPA mandates that:
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel31
ling governmental interest.

RLUIPA was significantly more circumscribed than RFRA. Congress determined that there was a specific need for legislation pro32
Members of Congress
tecting land used for religious purposes.
maintained that a religious group’s right to buy, rent, or build on
land is an “indispensable adjunct” of the First Amendment right to
33
gather for religious exercise and worship. RLUIPA was enacted following “three years of hearings . . . that addressed in great detail both
the need for legislation and the scope of Congressional power to en34
The legislative hearing record accumulated
act such legislation.”
considerable evidence of widespread violations of the right to assem28

Carmella & Gressman, supra note 17, at 141; 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7777
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
29
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 897
(N.D. Ill. 2005).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). Professor Carmella refers to land use regulations as
including: historic preservation, zoning and planning, environmental protection,
urban renewal, and nondiscrimination in housing. Angela C. Carmella, Land Use
Regulation of Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF
IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 565, 565 (James A. Serritella ed., 2006).
31
Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B).
32
See infra Part II.C.
33
146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch
and Sen. Kennedy).
34
Id.
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35

ble for worship. Religious institutions “are frequently discriminated
against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individual36
ized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.” To combat
this problem and support Congress’s objectives, RLUIPA specifies
that it is to be “construed in favor of a broad protection of religious
37
exercise.”
Professor Angela Carmella posits that the extent to which a government will accommodate religious land use depends on “whether
equality or liberty is considered the paramount value in contempo38
rary constitutional interpretation.” A high value on equality would
protect religious institutions from discriminatory treatment, but place
religious organizations on the same terms as their secular counter39
parts. Conversely, a high value on liberty would treat religious organizations more preferably than their secular counterparts due to
40
Professor
the unique place religious institutions hold in society.
Carmella argues that RLUIPA incorporates both rationales through a
complementary approach: “[t]he law embraces a liberty rationale
when it sets out to protect religious land use from burdensome zoning and historic preservation regulation that lack compelling justification. It adopts an equality rationale when it sets a protective floor,
preventing government discrimination towards and exclusion of reli41
RLUIPA, devised in this fashion, signals a new
gious land use.”
commitment to the elimination of burdens that inhibit religious
42
freedom.
If faced with a constitutional challenge to RLUIPA, it appears
highly likely that the Supreme Court will find RLUIPA to be a consti43
tutionally valid exercise of congressional power. Relying upon its
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause,
and the Spending Clause, Congress “made the law extremely specific

35

Id.
Id.
37
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-3(g) (2000).
38
Carmella, supra note 30, at 565 (footnote omitted).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 565–66.
41
Id. at 566.
42
See id. at 571.
43
See Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 315–16 (D. Mass.
2006) (observing that “nearly every court which has considered the issue” has found
RLUIPA’s constraints on land use regulations constitutional).
36
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to ensure the law was narrowly tailored” so that it would pass constitutional muster and not be invalidated by the Supreme Court as its
45
predecessor—RFRA—was earlier in the decade. RLUIPA was specifically designed to be narrower than RFRA, although it offers similar protection for religious institutions from unwarranted govern46
Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA “codified existing free
mental intrusions.
exercise, Establishment Clause, and equal protection rights . . . [and]
did not attempt any substantive change in constitutional protec47
tion.” Accordingly, nearly every court to address RLUIPA has found
48
it constitutional. In August 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of RLUIPA
49
in Elsinore Christian Center. v. City of Lake Elsinore. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court decision, which was possibly the only deci50
sion ever to find the Act’s land use provisions unconstitutional.
B. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago

51

Even if RLUIPA is constitutional, however, the question of
whether its reach extends to exercises of eminent domain remains
ambiguous. In one of the first cases to consider the question, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
in St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago that the city’s emi44

Kevin M. Powers, Note, The Sword and the Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle
Ground of Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 155 (2004).
45
Id. at 155–56.
46
Id.
47
DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 366 (2d ed. 2004).
48
Mintz, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 315–16 (collecting cases discussing the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land use provisions); see Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter,
456 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that RLUIPA was “constitutionally enacted . . . pursuant to [Congress’s] enforcement power within Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment”); San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360
F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously held
RLUIPA to be a “constitutional exercise of Congress’s spending power”); Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1237–43 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding
that RLUIPA is a “proper exercise of Congress’s . . . powers”); Freedom Baptist
Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 874 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding
RLUIPA’s land use provisions constitutional as applied to states and municipalities);
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1221 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (opining in dicta that RLUIPA “avoided the flaws of its
predecessor RFRA, and [is] within Congress’s constitutional authority”).
49
Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 197 F. App’x 718, 719 (9th Cir.
2006).
50
See Mintz, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 316. This Comment specifically addresses the
Act’s land use provisions and not the provisions pertaining to institutionalized persons.
51
401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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nent domain proceedings were outside of the umbrella of RLUIPA
52
protection. When the City of Chicago exercised its power of eminent domain in an effort to acquire land for the expansion of O’Hare
International Airport, land used by St. Johannes Cemetery and Rest
53
Haven Cemetery was included in the acquisition. Holding that the
City of Chicago’s authority to acquire land pursuant to its power of
eminent domain did not constitute a land use regulation under
54
RLUIPA, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had no basis for a
claim under the federal statute and thus dismissed the RLUIPA
55
claim. In concluding that RLUIPA did not apply to the eminent
domain proceedings alleged in this case, the court reasoned that the
Act applies only to governmental actions that “impose or implement
a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden
56
on the religious exercise of a person.” The court did not find any
statutory support for the proposition that a taking of land pursuant to
a government’s power of eminent domain directly constituted a land
use regulation under RLUIPA, and therefore, statutory protection of
57
the land used by the religious institution was not warranted.

52

Id. at 900.
Id. at 890–91. While the acquisition was pending, the City also passed the
O’Hare Modernization Act (OMA) to ward off opposition to the acquisition. Id. at
891. As amended by the OMA, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act stated
that “[n]othing in this act limits the authority of the City of Chicago to exercise its
powers . . . for the purposes of relocation of cemeteries or the graves located
therein.” Id. at 891 (internal citations omitted). The OMA was unmistakably intended to silence religious objections to the taking. See id.
54
The Village, the Church, and the Cemeteries were named as plaintiffs. Id. at
891.
55
Id. at 901. The remaining constitutional claims against the City of Chicago, the
FAA, and the State of Illinois alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment eventually failed as well. Id. In regard to the Free Exercise claim, the law treats all land in
the path of expansion the same and the city does not specifically discriminate against
religion in its acquisition of land. Id. at 898. Thus, the court need only apply a rational basis test. Id. Chicago’s actions “are rationally related to the legitimate government objective of expanding and improving O’Hare,” thus the Free Exercise
claim fails. Id. In regard to the Equal Protection claim, “where a plaintiff’s First
Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, the Supreme Court has applied only a
rational basis scrutiny in its subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental
right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts.” Id. (quoting Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282–83 (1st Cir. 2005)). Therefore, this claim fails as
well. See id. at 898–901.
56
Id. at 887; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
57
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
53
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While the majority conclusion in St. John’s gives credence to the
argument that eminent domain is not a land use regulation under
RLUIPA, the primary case cited by the plaintiffs in St. John’s—and
most often proffered by those who contend that RLUIPA does apply to
eminent domain proceedings—is Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress
58
Redevelopment Agency. In that case, the Cottonwood Christian Center
was denied the necessary permit for the expansion of its church facili59
ties. Subsequent to the denial of the permit, the city made plans to
take the Cottonwood property by its power of eminent domain and
60
In an action brought by the
turn it over to a private developer.
Church against the City of Cypress and the Cypress Redevelopment
Agency under RLUIPA, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunc61
tion halting the eminent domain actions. The Cottonwood court rejected the defendants’ claim that RLUIPA does not apply to the government’s condemnation action because it is not a land use regulation, as set forth under the Act, and instead applied RLUIPA’s strict
62
scrutiny analysis to review the city’s actions.
In St. John’s, the court distinguished the reasoning of the Cottonwood court and rejected the plaintiffs’ dependence on the Cottonwood
63
case. While the “[p]laintiffs contend[ed] that Cottonwood stands for
the proposition that all exercises of eminent domain authority are
subject to RLUIPA . . . . [the c]ourt [wa]s not willing to take such an
expansive view, nor [did] it believe that Cottonwood stands for such a
64
sweeping proposition.” The St. John’s court asserted that Cottonwood
could only be read to suggest that RLUIPA applies to “specific eminent domain actions where the condemnation proceeding is inter65
twined with other actions by the city involving zoning regulations.”
In addition to finding the reasoning of the Cottonwood court unpersuasive, the St. John’s court aptly noted that there is an attenuated

58

Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
59
Id. at 1214; cf. St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (carefully noting the difference
in the governmental use of power exercised directly against the property in Cottonwood (a permit denial of the facility expansion) as compared to the governmental use
of power in St. John’s (eminent domain proceeding directly against the religious
property)).
60
Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1214–15.
61
Id. at 1209.
62
Id. at 1221–22
63
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 899–900.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 900.
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relationship between eminent domain and zoning. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the City’s actions “can be linked
to zoning regulations because the City’s proposed actions ‘impose
severe restrictions on St. John’s use or development of St. Johannes[
]’ . . . [and] are attempts to regulate the land and so are an act of
67
zoning.” The court emphasized that the acquisition was not a restriction on the use of the land and to call it so would not only be a
major understatement, but an incorrect classification of the govern68
Although land use regulations
ment’s eminent domain powers.
limit an owner’s use of property and condemnations are the ultimate
limitation on an owner’s use of property, the court clarified that this
similarity does not mean that a taking automatically constitutes a land
69
use regulation under RLUIPA. In reaching its holding, the court
declared that it was “no[t] persuaded that it should construe the concept of zoning so broadly that any acquisition of land by the City pur70
The
suant to eminent domain proceedings is an act of zoning.”
court highlighted the fact that a material distinction exists between
land use regulations and condemnation proceedings, and that Congress’s purposeful exclusion of eminent domain from its definition of
a land use regulation under the Act is of great consequence in this
71
ongoing debate.
This issue is hotly contested in the lower courts and has yet to
reach the Supreme Court of the United States. An evaluation of the
legislative history of RLUIPA, however, provides some guidance as to
the congressional purpose behind the Act and the intended scope of
the Act.
C. RLUIPA’s Legislative History Examined
While parties on both sides of the debate use legislative history
to bolster their position, the legislative evidence more strongly supports the argument that a taking is not intended to be included under the Act. In the City of Chicago’s trial brief, the City alleged that
Congress’s definition of a land use regulation was specifically narrow

66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at n.7.
Id. at 900.
Id.
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
Id.
Id.
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72

and deliberate.
Considering the constitutionally sensitive time at
which Congress enacted RLUIPA, many argue that the limited definition of land use regulation was purposeful “as RLUIPA’s drafters
sought to ‘avoid the . . . fate’ of judicial invalidation that befell
73
RFRA.” A quick reference to the Smith, RFRA, Boerne, and RLUIPA
progression provides support for the necessity of having such a strictly
74
focused construction of the statute. Indeed, Senator Reid drew attention to the relevance of this progression in the Congressional Re75
cord.
“The legislative history [of RLUIPA] indicates that Congress was
concerned about local governments’ use of their zoning authority to
discriminate against religious groups by making it difficult or impos76
sible for them to build places of worship or other facilities.” Verifying RLUIPA’s purpose, Representative Charles Canady of Florida asserted that the Act “will protect the free exercise of religion from un77
necessary government interference.” Senator Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts and Senator Michael Dewine of Ohio, who were skeptical about the passage of the RLUIPA bill and expressed several concerns about RLUIPA, did not refer at all to eminent domain proceed78
ings and their relevance under the Act. The Senators’ failure to
mention eminent domain is evidence that it was unlikely within the
79
desired legislative scope and direction of the bill. Likewise, the leg-

72

Brief for Defendant at 33, St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F.
Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 05-4418) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of
Chicago’s Brief].
73
Id.
74
See supra Part II.A.
75
146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Reid).
76
Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. E1564 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (regarding “zoning conflicts between churches and cities”); see also 146 CONG.
REC. E1564 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (pointing out that in
the ten years prior to the Act’s enactment “zoning conflicts between churches and
cities [had] become a leading church-state issue”); 146 CONG. REC. E1234--35 (daily
ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (noting instances where a municipality
“intentionally changed a zone to exclude a church,” but containing no reference to
eminent domain).
77
146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
78
146 CONG. REC. S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (comments of Sen. Dewine and
Sen. Kennedy).
79
146 CONG. REC. S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (comments of Sen. Dewine
and Sen. Kennedy) (“I was concerned that the bill would have unintentionally impeded the ability of states and localities to protect the health and safety of children in
a variety of ways . . . . I am relieved that the . . . version has a much more limited
scope.”); 146 CONG. REC. S6688--89 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (comments of Sen. Ken-
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islative history illustrates that the members of Congress sought to narrow the scope of RLUIPA so that it avoided “possible conflict with
other civil rights protections, and those concerns were addressed.
But among all these expressions of concern that served to narrow the
Act, not a soul complained the RLUIPA would overreach by covering
80
eminent domain laws as one type of ‘zoning law.’” Moreover, it is
well settled that it is not the court’s proper function to add language
81
to a statute in an effort to stretch its applicability.
Tracing the history of RLUIPA and the recent district court cases
evaluating the Act’s application to eminent domain proceedings is
helpful, but not determinative, in analyzing whether an eminent domain proceeding is a land use regulation within the purview of
RLUIPA. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the question.
Until that time, the resolution to the debate will be left open-ended
and a religious institution’s protections under RLUIPA from eminent
domain will be unpredictable. Most notably, the St. John’s court alluded to what seems to be the most promising basis for applying
RLUIPA to the review of eminent domain proceedings—a taking that
82
occurs amidst the imposition of a land use regulation.
III. TAKINGS AND LAND USE REGULATIONS UNDER RLUIPA
This Part considers the arguments by proponents of each side of
the debate. As noted above, RLUIPA defines the term “land use
regulation” as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of
such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of
83
This Comment explores three possible resolutions to the
land.”

nedy) (noting that authors of the RLUIPA bill “were mindful of not undermining
existing laws intended to protect other important civil rights and civil liberties”).
80
Brief for Plaintiff, St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, No. 03-C3726
(N.D. Ill. 2005) at 24 [hereinafter St. John’s Brief]; see 146 CONG. REC. H7190--91
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (comments of Rep. Nadler, Sen. Reid, Sen. Kennedy, and
Sen. Dewine); 146 CONG. REC. H7190 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (comments of Rep.
Nadler) (“I am aware of no opposition from any religious or civil rights or civil liberties group . . . .”).
81
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
82
St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899–901
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
83
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5)
(2000).
The term “land use regulation” means a zoning or landmarking law, or
the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or
development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other
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question of whether the exercise of eminent domain is a land use
regulation: (1) a taking is never a land use regulation under RLUIPA;
(2) a taking is always a land use regulation under RLUIPA; or (3) a
taking is within the scope of RLUIPA if it is employed in the implementation of a land use regulation. Courts are just beginning to explore the question and are split as to the correct answer.
A. A Taking is Never a Land Use Regulation Under RLUIPA
A number of sources lend support to the proposition that a taking is not a per se land use regulation under RLUIPA—among others, district court decisions, universal notions of state sovereign
power, and the acknowledged differentiating characteristics between
eminent domain actions and land use regulations. While each theory
differs slightly in substance, the significant weight of the obtainable
evidence tips in favor of not applying RLUIPA to every eminent domain proceeding that concerns sacred land.
1.

District Court Analysis
84

Examined first in St. John’s and again in Faith Temple Church v.
85
Town of Brighton, the question of whether eminent domain proceedings are per se land use regulations under RLUIPA has received judicial attention. Following St. John’s, the district court in Faith Temple
also rejected the proposition that an eminent domain proceeding is
86
per se a land use regulation. Central to the Faith Temple court’s reasoning was the nature of authority underlying a zoning law as op87
posed to an eminent domain proceeding. “[T]owns are authorized
by statute to enact zoning laws ‘to regulate and restrict’” a property
owner’s private use of land, while in contrast, local and state govern88
ments have the power to take land for the public use. Acknowledging that these are two distinct concepts of authority, albeit both involving land, the Faith Temple court aptly noted a key distinction between eminent domain actions and land use regulations—the gov89
ernment uses its power over the land in very different ways.

property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.
Id.
84
85
86
87
88
89

St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887.
405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 256–57.
See id. at 253–56.
Id. at 254.
Id.
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Further considering the differences between zoning and eminent domain, the Faith Temple court considered it suspect that Congress would interpret RLUIPA’s explicit statutory reference to zoning
as a type of land use regulation automatically to include eminent
90
Congress proactively chose to limit the
domain actions as well.
91
Thus, because “[e]minent doscope and application of the Act.
main is hardly an arcane or little-known concept . . . the [c]ourt will
not assume that Congress simply overlooked it when drafting
92
The Faith Temple court asserted that a relationship to
RLUIPA.”
93
land use is not enough to bring it within the purview of RLUIPA. It
is not enough to regard zoning and condemnation proceedings as
synonymous merely because they both have the potential to affect the
94
land and to restrict the uses to which the land may be put. Congress
could have included both eminent domain and zoning within the
coverage the Act, but it did not choose to do so and it is not the
proper function of the court to “judicially amend RLUIPA to ‘correct’
95
Congress’s omission.”
Scrutiny of the district court analysis identifies another facet of
the debate. Those who are in support of RLUIPA’s application to
condemnation proceedings contend that § 2000cc-3(g) of RLUIPA
provides evidence of congressional intent for broader Act application
96
and protection. The provision reads: “[t]his chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Con97
stitution.” The St. John’s plaintiffs argued that the City defendants
applied the wrong rule of construction when interpreting § 2000cc98
3(g). The plaintiffs contended that because RLUIPA is federal civil
rights legislation, the provision should have been applied broadly so
99
that it could best effectuate the purpose of the Act. Although the
St. John’s court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ contention, it was aware
of RLUIPA’s admonition that the Act was to be construed broadly in
90

Id. at 254–55.
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–55.
92
Id. at 255.
93
Id. at 257–58.
94
Id. at 258.
95
Id.
96
See St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 23–24.
97
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)
(2000).
98
St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24.
99
Id.
91
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favor of protecting religious exercise. For that reason, the court
stated that its holding “should not be taken to mean that all condem100
nation proceedings necessarily are outside the scope of RLUIPA.”
The court, in qualifying its statement in regard to the language of
§ 2000cc-3(g), declared that the obligation to broadly protect religious exercise can only inflate to the extent permitted by the Act’s
terms because “[s]uch language does not itself alter Congress’s ex101
press delineation of the statute’s reach.” The court asserted that to
read the clause otherwise would violate basic rules of statutory con102
struction, for it is an accepted principle that a “definition which
declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not
103
Furthermore, the St. John’s plaintiffs’ contention that “all
stated.”
condemnation proceedings are land use regulations dealing with zoning . . . is not an attempt to construe the statute broadly but rather is
104
an attempt to rewrite it.” Thus, for fear of other courts misconstruing its holding, the St. John’s court clearly delineated the limits of its
ruling.
2. Eminent Domain Versus Land Use Regulations
The differences between an eminent domain action and a land
105
The chief
use regulation as used under RLUIPA are numerous.
difference between a land use regulation and an eminent domain
proceeding is how the land is restricted. A land use regulation involves the government restricting how private parties may use the
land, while an eminent domain proceeding involves a compelled
106
transfer of private land to the public for the public benefit and use.
The “core of eminent domain power has nothing to do with the regulation of the use of property by others, but instead provides property
100

St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D. Ill.
2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (“[A]n act to acquire land (through eminent domain) and then to rezone it and transfer it might
very well fall with[in] the reach of RLUIPA.”).
101
City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 39 n.11.
102
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1993); Callanan v. United
States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“[A] construction clause does not invite the court
to apply the statute to new purposes that were never intended by Congress. Such a
clause, ‘as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.’”).
103
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 393 (1979) (quoting 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978) (internal quotations
omitted)).
104
St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
105
City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 34–37.
106
Id. at 34.
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107

for the government’s own use.” In Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, the
Supreme Court, declared that the taking of property enables the
108
Historically,
“proper performance of governmental functions.”
eminent domain has been distinguished from “other forms of governmental action that deprive persons of property values . . . by the
fact that . . . the government puts the property taken to a specific,
109
Landmarking and zoning regulations do
publicly mandated use.”
not change the ownership of the land in a way that allows the government to have complete control. While such government actions
may adjust how the land is used, they do not mandate that land be
used only for the government’s chosen purpose and only by whom
the government chooses; this differing degree of ownership is a vital
110
distinction.

107

Id. at 35.
264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924).
109
See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1183
(1995).
110
See City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 34–35. When tracing the history
and development of the government’s zoning power in contrast to the government’s
eminent domain power, another difference between the two becomes apparent.
Zoning is a generally modern invention, while eminent domain is a concept that
predates the United States Constitution and has always been recognized as an “inherent right to the sovereign.” Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 250, 254 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); see also E. Thirteenth St. Cmty. Ass’n v. N.Y.
State Urban Dev. Corp., 641 N.E.2d 1368 (N.Y. 1994).
Another dissimilarity between zoning laws and eminent domain proceedings is
the general purpose for which the two governmental actions are authorized.
“[Z]oning statutes seek to protect ‘the welfare of the entire community’ by making a
balanced and effective use of the available land and providing for the public need for
varying types of uses and structures.” E. Thirteenth St. Cmty. Ass'n, 641 N.E.2d at 1371
(citations omitted). While zoning laws will be found invalid if they “are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare,” eminent domain proceedings do not have to be for the
public health, safety, etc. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
The eminent domain public use requirement is much broader than that allowed for
zoning measures. The “primary concern of land use regulations is not economics,
but the promotion of public health and safety and aesthetics,” while the concept and
pertinence of economics is a budding aspect of eminent domain actions. Julie M.
Osborn, Note, RLUIPA’s Land Use Provision: Congress’ Unconstitutional Response to City of
Boerne, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 155, 174 (2004). The Supreme Court decision in Kelo further verifies this distinction between zoning measures and eminent
domain actions. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In warning about
the incorrect fusing of the two categories of government’s power over land—zoning
and eminent domain—the dissent in Kelo added that “whether the State can take
property using the power of eminent domain is . . . distinct from the question
whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power.” Id. at 519 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
108
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A further incongruity between eminent domain actions and land
use regulations pertains to the nature of the inquiry involved in each
action—individualized assessment versus non-individualized assessment. It is theorized that the Takings Clause is “designed to bar [the
government] from forcing some people alone to bear the public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
111
Thus, condemnation proceedings individually assess
as a whole.”
each parcel of land subject to the government’s eminent domain
power to ensure the constitutional requirements are satisfied and that
the power of eminent domain is exercised non-discriminately. To the
contrary, zoning and landmarking laws are the types of government
laws that characteristically do not involve individualized assess112
ments. Zoning measures generally apply to every property within a
specific zoning area without a comprehensive assessment of each par113
Zoning laws embody the policy judgments of local and
cel of land.
state officials about what the best uses of private property are in a particular area. Zoning ordinances “provide control over land use within
a neighborhood and are part of a comprehensive plan for community
114
Notwithstanding the principle of nondevelopment.”
individualized assessment that traditionally applied to zoning enactments, RLUIPA now requires the government to evaluate each property with a religious affiliation individually and apart from other types
115
of land prior to the enactment of a zoning plan. RLUIPA provides
111

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
112
See City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 36. But see supra Part IV.C.
113
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997); cf. SELMI & KUSHNER,
supra note 47, at 45 (“All of the flexibility devices have the common characteristic of
focusing on the individual impacts from a particular development or use, rather than
on the needs of the jurisdiction as a whole.”); Angela C. Carmella, Zoning of Religious
Uses, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW 574, 574 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000). Carmella
argues:
This assumption of general applicability is incorrect. Built into zoning
laws are numerous mechanisms for exceptions and special consideration. Variances, hardship exemptions, and special permits are among
the many discretionary mechanisms present in land use ordinances;
these are necessary to provide flexibility in an area subject to constant
pressures for change. Under Smith, it seems that statutory regimes
which contain exemption mechanisms (with government making “individualized assessments” in discretionary fashion) may continue to enjoy the highest level of judicial review, the compelling interest test.
The analysis is thus not as simple as Justice Kennedy . . . suggests.
Carmella, Zoning of Religious Uses, at 574.
114
See 83 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 3 (2006).
115
See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1
(2000).
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religious institutions protection from discriminatory zoning measures
in a manner similar to the constitutionally mandated protections and
individualized assessments of the Takings Clause.
The dissimilarity between the level of community involvement
necessary and ordinarily implicated in the execution of each power is
notable. In eminent domain proceedings, there is greater public involvement and far greater scrutiny by the public and various public
116
These checks and balances are needed to prevent abuse
officials.
117
On the other hand, zoning and landof this constitutional right.
marking laws do not have constitutionally established checks and balances set in place. Although religious institutions often receive a
safeguard from zoning measures due to their non-conforming use
118
status, many situations exist where that status does not protect the
religious institution from government intrusion. Therefore, a federal
statute such as RLUIPA is disputably necessary to prevent abuse of
119
Furthermore, zoning and landmarking laws are
religious actors.
relatively easy for towns to enact, while condemnation proceedings
are costly and come at a literal price to the government—the fair
120
Arguably, zoning and landmarking
market value of the property.
regulations also have more oppressive implications for property owners, in that property values are often lowered without compensation
by the government. While governments in eminent domain proceedings are subject to the constitutionally mandated payment of just
compensation, the government is able simply to “take” land through
121
zoning regulations without compensating the property owner.

116

City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 41.
Id.
118
SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 47, at 67–70. The idea behind a non-conforming
use is to let a property owner’s land use continue under the new zoning plan—even
though such use would not be permitted under the plan—because the use existed
prior to the zoning measure’s enactment and it would be unfair to deprive the property owner of his or her expected use of such property. Id. Ideally, any expansion of
the non-conforming property or of the property’s non-conforming use will be restricted and eventually removed. Id.
119
City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 41.
120
See United States v. 6.45 Acres of Land, 409 F.3d 139, 145 (3rd Cir. 2005); Faith
Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
121
City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 41. An interesting debate in this area
involves Justice Holmes’s holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, that land use
regulations that go “too far” can actually constitute a taking. 260 U.S. 393, 415–16
(1922); see SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 47, at 315–16. But see SELMI & KUSHNER, supra
note 47, at 317 (“[A] number of scholars have suggested that, based on the historical
record, a ‘taking’ meant an actual expropriation of property. The effects of land use
117
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State Sovereign Power Considered

Notions of state sovereign power buttress the preceding arguments and set the foundation for a supplemental line of reasoning in
favor of finding eminent domain outside the boundaries of RLUIPA
protection. While this argument is not grounded on finding an eminent domain proceeding to be outside the RLUIPA definition of a
land use regulation, it nonetheless provides some insight as to why
eminent domain actions would not have been included under the Act
in the first place, regardless of whether an eminent domain proceed122
ing could ever be deemed a land use regulation.
Eminent domain power is one traditionally reserved to the
123
Thus,
states—“it is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative.”
cognitive of state eminent domain power, it is possible that Congress
purposefully did not extend RLUIPA to eminent domain actions so as
to not interfere with the state’s power to take religious or nonreligious lands for the public benefit. And, “[a]bsent an unmistakably clear expression of intent to alter the usual constitutional balance
between the states and the federal government, [the courts] will interpret a statute to preserve rather than destroy the States’ substantial
124
sovereign powers.”

regulation thus would not result in takings . . . an excessive land use regulation is
simply an invalid regulation.”).
122
Cf. Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 1000. The view that RLUIPA infringes
on a state’s right to exercise its power of eminent domain is not widespread. Storzer
and Picarello dispel the notion that RLUIPA cannot supersede this state power:
RLUIPA aims to assure that all courts (federal and state alike) purporting to apply federal constitutional protections do not ignore their continuing vitality. To claim that this codification of existing federal limits
on local discretionary power represents some novel infringement on
States’ rights is to mischaracterize not only the statute and the constitutional jurisprudence it enforces, but also the history of the States’ concern for local abuses of religious freedom.
Id. They suggest that RLUIPA’s purpose is not to inhibit a state’s right to exercise its
powers, but to assist the states in their protection of the religious freedoms they apparently deem so important. From this line of reasoning, it can be inferred that not
all eminent domain proceedings are to be automatically approved simply because
the power to exercise a taking is one traditionally held by the state itself. Thus, while
the state sovereignty argument has potential, it is not necessarily the strongest line of
attack against RLUIPA’s application to condemnation proceedings.
123
La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959); see Searl v. Sch.
Dist. No. 2 in Lake County, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890) (stating that the eminent domain right “is the offspring of political necessity, and is inseparable from sovereignty”).
124
Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (internal quotations
omitted).
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The St. John’s plaintiffs alluded to the states’ sovereign power ar125
They contended that the city defengument in their trial brief.
126
Only
dants incorrectly applied the principles of Gregory v. Ashcroft.
state functions that “go to the heart of the representative govern127
128
The plaintiffs asment” are protected by the Ashcroft decision.
serted that such a limiting phrase would hardly include the taking of
a cemetery for the expansion of an interstate transportation system
that was subsidized largely by federal government and had a tremen129
Despite the plaintiffs’ argudous effect on interstate commerce.
ment cutting against the state sovereign power theory, the court, by
not explicitly addressing whether eminent domain actions fall under
the type of Ashcroft governmental functions that are protected from
federal statutory interference, left open the possibility that eminent
domain actions are out of the reach of federal statutory schemes such
as RLUIPA due to the power of the sovereign state.
A number of authorities lend support to the proposition that a
taking is not a per se land use regulation under RLUIPA. The significant weight of the obtainable information, as will be clear by the end
of this Comment, obviously tips in favor of not applying RLUIPA to
130
Nevertheless, as the debate is just
eminent domain proceedings.
commencing, the arguments in favor of this position are still malleable, and this faction’s strengths and weaknesses will inevitably be
131
tested as the debate roars on.
125

St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24.
501 U.S. 452 (1991) (affirming the authority of state citizens to determine the
qualifications of important government officials, a state function protected by the
Tenth Amendment); St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24.
127
St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24. The plaintiffs in St. John’s argue that the
City’s rule of construction “would have the Court interpret federal statutes to avoid
any interference with state governmental functions which, Defendants claim, includes eminent domain power. Yet nowhere is such a rule announced in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, on which the City relies.” Id. (citation omitted).
128
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
129
St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 25.
130
A pro-government effect of a taking not being considered a land use regulation
is that once the city acquires title to the land via eminent domain there will no
longer be a RLUIPA claim. Once the city acquires title, the RLUIPA claim selfdestructs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(5).
131
Carmella, supra note 30, at 579.
Private covenants [and defeasible estates] are used not only to exclude
religious uses in these indirect ways but also to perpetuate religious
uses . . . . [They] often function just like zoning restrictions. . . .
[B]ecause they do not invoke state action, these private agreements are
not subject to constitutional scrutiny in the way that zoning is.
126
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B. A Taking Is Always a Land Use Regulation Under RLUIPA
The proposition that a taking is considered a land use regulation
under the RLUIPA is not well supported by many authorities. Those
in favor of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings desire a RLUIPA strict scrutiny analysis to be applied to condemnation
proceedings that burden religious exercise. Thus, if eminent domain
is encompassed within the protection of the Act, the government will
have to meet a higher standard of review to take land used by religious institutions.
The primary authority in support of this view is the decision by
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
132
Without
in Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Development Agency.
much discussion, the court assumed that an eminent domain proceeding was within the bounds of a RLUIPA land use regulation simply because the government action restricted the Christian Center’s
use of land—an assumption that blurred the important distinction
between the various ways in which land can be restricted by govern133
Although the court’s analysis was possibly
ment interference.
134
founded on an improper interpretation of the statute, the court
nevertheless found that the condemnation proceeding at issue was
within the scope of RLUIPA, and thus the taking was invalid under
135
the Act.
In addition, the Cottonwood court maintained that Congress, by
its passage of RLUIPA, “conclusively determined the national public
policy that religious land uses are to be guarded from interference by
local governments to the maximum extent permitted by the ConstituId. Although eminent domain proceedings are outside the power of the individual
land owner, an interesting question is the extent to which religious institutions can
protect themselves from government actions by private land covenants. Perhaps,
the way legally to effectuate [the desire to not have a church built next
door] is by private mutual covenants between property owners imposing appropriate servitudes on the land. We must not “employ the new
device of zoning to make exclusive districts much more exclusive.” [I]t
is [not] a proper function of government to interfere in the name of
the public to exclude churches from residential districts for the purpose of securing to adjacent landowners the benefits of exclusive residential restrictions.
O’Brien v. Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (quoting Ohio v. Joseph, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942)) (citation omitted).
132
218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
133
Id. at 1222. Note the distinction between the use restrictions of a permit denial
and the use restrictions of a condemnation proceeding.
134
See St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D.
Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
135
Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
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136

tion.”
From this concept it can be inferred that the court also
found protection in the Constitution for preventing this taking, although such protections were not clearly set forth in the opinion.
Conceivably, because the land was being transferred from private
ownership to a use that was debatably not a constitutionally protected
public use—a private retail corporation—the condemnation proceed137
ing ran contrary to the public’s interest. Thus, it is possible that the
138
taking could have been prohibited on those grounds. Needless to
say, the Cottonwood court’s line of reasoning has been sharply questioned and would likely not hold up if dissected by an appellate court
today.
139
Professor Shelley Ross Saxer supports a second justification for
140
Saxer conRLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings.
tends that even though an eminent domain action is not specifically
within the classification of a zoning or landmarking law as defined
under RLUIPA, excluding eminent domain proceedings from the
Act’s reach would be inappropriate considering the context in which
141
She argues
the definition of land use regulation was formulated.
that the bill narrowly described a land use regulation in order “to address concerns about the potential for civil rights violations . . . [but]
there is no indication that Congress changed the definition language
in order to restrict the type of land use decision subject to
142
Accordingly, she argues it would be a mistake to parse
RLUIPA.”

136

Id. at 1230–31.
Id. at 1231.
138
Id.
139
The particular class of people who benefit from a taking can possibly form the
basis for a third argument in favor of applying RLUIPA to eminent domain proceedings. Generally, a condemnation action benefits the majority of the public, while a
land use regulation—for example, a zoning or landmarking law—is to the detriment
of a minority group of landowners. Arguably, a smaller number of interests are at
stake with a land use regulation, because it is not designed to benefit the majority of
the public, whereas eminent domain proceedings are specifically undertaken for the
advantage of the public majority. Since land use regulations only affect a minority of
individual property owners, it seems fair to give a religious institution affected by a
land use regulation some additional protection. It seems more viable to award the
minority interest holders some leniency, especially when they are asking for the leniency in order to protect a value that ultimately serves the majority—namely First
Amendment religious freedom of expression.
140
Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses,
69 MO. L. REV. 653 (2004).
141
Id. at 668–69.
142
Id.
137
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the language in a way that would exclude eminent domain proceed143
ings from the reach of the Act’s land use regulation definition.
Support for the proposition that eminent domain proceedings
144
should be considered land use regulations under RLUIPA is scarce.
Nonetheless, it is important to concentrate on the most potentially
successful arguments on this side of the debate. Being that Supreme
Court jurisprudence is non-existent, and fundamental scholarship is
outdated, unfounded, or inapplicable, this pro-side of the debate is
not yet condemned.
C. A Taking Is Within RLUIPA if Carried Out in the Implementation
of a Land Use Regulation
An intermediate approach to the question of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings may be the most effective argument for religious institutions to make. Perhaps by limiting
RLUIPA’s applicability to situations where eminent domain is used as
part of a plan that effectuates a land use regulation, a middle ground
can be achieved so that governments and religious institutions alike
would be pleased. Focusing on the Act’s language and a commonsense construction of it, it seems that an acceptable way to resolve the
current predicament would be to allow eminent domain proceedings
to fall within RLUIPA’s purview only when they occur as part of a
plan that ultimately implements a land use regulation.
Allowing RLUIPA to apply to eminent domain actions in these
certain instances would offer religious institutions the protection that
Congress deemed them worthy of receiving when it first enacted
145
Religious institutions often qualify as non-conforming
RLUIPA.
146
uses and are temporarily exempt from local zoning plans. Because
non-conforming use status by itself offers religious institutions a protection from potentially devastating zoning measures, the nonconforming use status practically makes RLUIPA inapplicable and
unnecessary. A government may, however, attempt to use its eminent
domain power over the non-conforming use property in a way that
143

Id. at 669.
Adverse possession against cemeteries is not permitted, absent evidence of
complete and actual abandonment of the burial ground site. See Mary L. Clark,
Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land
Associated with Human Death and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487, 496 (2005). Arguably, this
rule evidences a general governmental intent to protect religious sites, and would
therefore compliment the notion that an eminent domain action is a land use regulation under RLUIPA. See id. 496–98.
145
See supra Part II.C.
146
See SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 47, at 68–70.
144
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would circumvent the religious institution’s non-conforming use
status. This would, in effect, turn restricted non-conforming use
property into unrestricted property that could then fit freely into a
zoning plan. Moreover, without special protection, religious property
that is not classified as a non-conforming use would still be subject to
147
In an effort to reach its
the government’s eminent domain power.
land use goals, the government may opt to condemn the religious
property in order to gain control of it, instead of using zoning measures that are subject to strict RLUIPA scrutiny. In a situation like
this—when the taking is actually being done for the ultimate implementation of a land use regulation—RLUIPA should apply to protect
the religious institution from the taking.
The intent to include eminent domain proceedings within
RLUIPA’s reach in this particular way is evidenced by the particular
148
choice of language in § 2000cc(a). Arguably, by selecting the word
“implement” Congress expected that the “means the government uses
to ‘implement’ a land use regulation may [also] substantially burden
149
Thus, although the means used by the governreligious exercise.”
ment may not qualify as a per se land use regulation, if the end is a
land use regulation then the means used by the government to put
that land use regulation into action may actually be covered under
150
RLUIPA. Applying similar reasoning to the question of whether or
not an eminent domain proceeding is a land use regulation under
the Act, it could effectively be argued that when eminent domain is
used as a precursor to a zoning measure—for example, the implementation of a zoning development plan—then it is a means used to
reach the end and is therefore covered under RLUIPA.
The above rationale helps resolve some of the discrepancies surrounding the debate because “[v]ery often a land use regulation by
itself may not substantially burden religious exercise, but the means

147

Arguably, RLUIPA standards afford greater protection to religious institutions
than the constitutional requirements of a taking. While eminent domain proceedings are subject to the public use and compensation requirements, RLUIPA standards are more stringent, requiring a compelling governmental interest and the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. See Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000).
148
§ 2000cc(a).
149
Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, No. 06-0354-cv
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.becketfund.org/files/
1dec2.pdf [hereinafter Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief].
150
See id. at 5.
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151

used to implement that regulation do burden religious exercise.”
The St. John’s plaintiffs apply this justification broadly when they
maintain that the city’s authorization to change the use of land from
religious cemetery to airport property was an act of zoning because
the ordinance at issue constituted an “attempt by a government to
152
While the plaintiffs take
regulate the use of a piece of property.”
this line of reasoning a step beyond where most courts will likely be
prepared to go, the justification behind the rationale is sound.
The way a court frames the issue can affect the RLUIPA analysis
in regard to eminent domain proceedings. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, in its amicus brief in support of Faith Temple Church,
153
insists that the Faith Temple court erred when it failed to ask
whether the city’s use of eminent domain “implement[ed] a land use
regulation,” as RLUIPA’s language instructs, and instead asked
“whether eminent domain proceedings were themselves a land use
154
regulation within the meaning of RLUIPA.” Claiming that this type
of analysis by the courts will not protect religious institutions “from
the means used to implement land use regulations unless those
means are themselves land use regulations,” the Becket Fund argued
for a more strategic application of the RLUIPA implementation lan155
The Becket Fund contended that interpreting RLUIPA in
guage.
this stingy way in effect reads the word “implements” out of the Act’s
156
text and thus violates common principles of statutory construction.
This type of analysis in fact narrows the Act, rather than “construing
it in favor of broad protection of religious exercise” as § 2000cc-3(g)
157
Proponents of RLUIPA’s application to emiof RLUIPA requires.
nent domain proceedings argue that the “Court should not sheath
RLUIPA’s sword in a context where religious institutions are most
158
By focusing on the means used to execute a land use
vulnerable.”
regulation, courts will be more responsive to the role that the government’s eminent domain power plays in land use regulation
schemes and ultimately more likely to award religious institutions
their deserved protection under RLUIPA.
151

Id.
Second Amended Complaint for St. John’s United Church, St. John’s United
Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, No. 03-C-3726 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (on
file with author).
153
405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
154
Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 7.
155
Id. at 8.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 8.
158
Id. at 15.
152
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Limiting RLUIPA’s applicability to situations where eminent
domain is used in the implementation of a land use regulation is an
159
This
intermediate scheme that has been endorsed by some courts.
approach poses a great danger to the government’s power of eminent
domain, yet it poses an even greater promise to religious institutions
for protection from such power. As the discussion continues over
whether a land use regulation under the statute encompasses condemnation proceedings, the debate may instead switch gears and focus on how far the courts are willing to take the “in implementation
of a land use regulation” language as a means of bringing eminent
domain within RLUIPA’s reach.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS BEING
CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF RLUIPA
The implications of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain
actions will be widespread. However, the ramifications of eminent
domain not being considered a land use regulation under RLUIPA
are especially extensive considering the particular vulnerability of religious institutions. The consequences of such a ruling fuel the fire
of the debate. Religious institutions hold a significant place in the
history and culture of this country. Proponents of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings argue that holding land use
regulations outside the scope of RLUIPA will encourage local governments to “declare open season on the taking of religious property
160
of all kinds.” These proponents postulate that, when viewed in conjunction with the tax-free status of religious institutions, the Supreme
161
Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London will have tremendous implications on the government’s tendency to take land
from religious institutions. On the other hand, some scholars argue
that religious institutions have political influence over local governments, which will prevent such dramatic consequences from occurring because this political influence actually encourages governments
162
to actively avoid condemning religious property.

159

See St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D.
Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).
160
Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 4.
161
545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005).
162
See infra Part IV.C.
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A. The Significance of Religious Expression
Private property is used by religious institutions in a variety of
163
“Property provides a physical reality through which the
ways.
164
church manifests its religious structure.” Churches serve as the
meeting place for most religions and as the foundation of religious
165
As a result of the uniqueness of religious property use,
practice.
religious institutions will be particularly devastated by the power of
166
Regulations that prevent a church from existing
eminent domain.
167
Morewill inhibit the free and unhampered exercise of religion.
over, religious expression and a religious institution’s duty to the
public are inevitably burdened when cemeteries, soup kitchens,
schools, and other socially advantageous functions that religious insti168
tutions provide are condemned.
When the government seeks, through exercise of eminent domain, to dictate where a religious institution may or may not exist,
it inevitably treads on that religious institution’s autonomy and
expression . . . . Conforming religious institutions to the government’s vision of the “proper place” for such institutions, in effect,
169
imposes the government’s vision of their “proper role.”

A look back on our history at the great many wars that were
fought in the name of religion can provide some insight as to the
depth of the value we are seeking to protect, namely the freedom to
170
RLUIPA’s application to eminent
express and practice religion.

163

Carmella, supra note 30, at 566.
[A] 1994 Report on the Survey of Religious Organizations at the National Level, conducted by the Northwestern University Survey Laboratory and DePaul Law School’s Center for Church/State Studies, shows
that nearly all churches hold religious gatherings at least once a week;
additionally, two-thirds of religious organizations engage in social service or welfare activities; more than eighty percent are involved in education; nearly sixty percent provide recreation or social activities;
eighty-five percent are involved in communications; one-third have retreat centers; and forty percent have cemeteries.

Id.
164

See id. at 565.
Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 10.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Brief Amicus Curiae of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Petitioners at *5, Kelo v. City of New London, U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 801 (2004)
(No. 04-108) [hereinafter Becket Fund Kelo Brief].
170
ReligiousTolerance.Org, Basic Information on Religious Tolerance & Conflict,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/rel_tol1.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
165
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domain proceedings will become just one more battle won or lost in
the ongoing struggle for religious freedom.
B. The Kelo Effect
If eminent domain actions are outside the umbrella of RLUIPA
protection, the Kelo decision could inevitably increase the propensity
with which local governments legally exercise their eminent domain
171
Because of the Supreme Court’s skillful pronouncement
powers.
that economic development and revenue generation are valid public
172
purposes under the Takings Clause, it is argued that municipalities
now have an unprecedented power to condemn private property for
purely economic reasons under their constitutional power of eminent
173
Nevertheless, the governmental reaction to Kelo may not
domain.
be as drastic as envisioned. Many states have imposed stricter limits
than federal law as to what constitutes a public use, the primary goal
behind these narrowed parameters being to make eminent domain
174
unavailable for redevelopment projects.
Nevertheless, Kelo’s broadening of public use to include economic takings could presumably lead to an increased number of
condemnation proceedings against religious institutions for eco175
Religious institutions are almost
nomic development purposes.
176
universally non-profit and tax-exempt, and as a consequence they
normally do not generate much revenue for their local govern177
To the disadvantage of religious institutions, the class of
ments.
private properties eligible for an economic taking “in the name of
generating additional tax revenue is more limited . . . . [Eligibility] is
dependent on the nature of the present use of the property, the
178
identity of the owner, or both.” Consequently, by the nature of the
private property use religious institutions enjoy, such institutions and
the land they use for religious purposes—for example, cemetery
land—fit perfectly within the category of private property available

171

See Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *2.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
173
Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *3.
174
John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783,
789 (2006).
175
Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *2.
176
Id.
177
See id. at *18 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689
(1970)).
178
Id. at *16 n.21.
172
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for economic development and revenue generation.
According to
the Kelo ruling, it now seems that revenue-hungry governments are
free to use their power of eminent domain “to implement land use
plans that call for achieving economic development by replacing taxexempt religious uses with tax revenue generating commercial
180
Under a system that favors “for-profit tax-generating busiuses.”
181
nesses” over “non-profit, tax-exempt property owners,” religious
institutions will become easy targets for a government’s exercise of its
182
And, more and more, religious institueminent domain power.
tions will be found in the middle of redevelopment plans, for it is often too tempting for a city to pass up an opportunity to generate
more tax revenue by transferring religious property to private devel183
opers.
The incentives underlying the Kelo decision trigger the question
of whether economic development is more important than property
rights—a question the Kelo majority implicitly answered in the affirmative. Conceivably, economic development is a public use more
184
A key aspect of the conworthy of protection than church rights.
tinuing debate is which use serves the best public purpose—tax gen185
eration and revenue boosting, or tax-exempt religious institutions?
Reaching a result where religious institutions are valued less than tax
generation is ironic “because religious institutions are generally exempted from taxes precisely because they are deemed to be ‘beneficial
186
The United States
and stabilizing influences in community life.’”
179

Id. at *7 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 673).
Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 9–12 (listing examples of
municipalities targeting religious institutions for eminent domain proceedings—
primarily to “implement land use plans that they claim will generate tax revenue and
economic development”).
181
Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *7.
182
Id. at *8. Perhaps, even if eminent domain does not fall within the statute, the
taking might still be unjustified if the public benefit of the church/cemetery outweighs the public use the city is seeking to create through its power of eminent domain.
183
Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 9.
184
Jerry Falwell, Eminent Domain Knocking on Church’s Door, THE CONSERVATIVE
VOICE, (Jan. 21, 2006), http://www.theconservativevoice.com/article/11703.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
185
In theory, if the public use is great enough that a taking is deemed appropriate
in the first place, then should the taking not be appropriate regardless of what needs
to be taken? Along a similar line of reasoning, then even if eminent domain does
not fall within the bounds of RLUIPA, could the taking still be unjustified if the public benefit of the church or cemetery is found to outweigh the public use the city is
seeking to create through its power of eminent domain?
186
Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *7 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)) (emphasis added).
180
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has a long tradition in which religious institutions provide necessary
public goods to the community and serve the people through soup
187
kitchens, food drives, spiritual guidance, and the like. Accordingly,
the “government grants exemptions to religious organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society
188
Social science tells us that churches
by their religious activities.”
and other religious institutions do in fact promote the general public
189
While affirming the constituinterest and the common welfare.
tionality of tax exemptions for religious entities, the Supreme Court
recognized that certain entities “exist in a harmonious relationship to
the community at large, and . . . foster its moral or mental improvement, [and thus they] should not be inhibited in their activities by . .
190
. the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes.”
Nevertheless, the property rights of religious institutions remain at
risk due to the Kelo decision and the absence of a federal statutory
scheme—like RLUIPA—designed to protect religious institutions and
their land counterparts from the government’s selective power of
191
eminent domain.
C. Politics as a Sword for Religious Institutions
Interestingly, some respected scholars argue that governments
actually avoid using their power of eminent domain over religious
institutions, since governments reasonably prefer the course of action
192
that will generate the least amount of public outcry and resistance.
Nicole Stelle Garnett predicts that governments are “most likely to
avoid high subjective value property owned by the politically con193
nected.” Professor Garnett ascertains that takers have strong incentives to simply avoid the exercise of eminent domain over land holding high subjective value, namely land belonging to religious institu187

See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 930.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 689.
189
Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ind. 1961).
190
Walz, 397 U.S. at 672 (citations omitted).
191
Cf. Jeff Johnson, Eminent Domain: Churches Targeted by the Bulldozers, CNSNEWS.
COM, July 15, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=//Nation//
archive//200507//NAT20050715a.html. Johnson argues that the Kelo decision is
not as devastating to the property rights of religious institutions because of the
strength of the First Amendment constitutional protections, as well as other federal
and state laws. Id.
192
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 103, 116 (2006). Planners for a roadway in Chicago “assiduously”
avoided the taking and ultimate demolition of over 400 churches. Id. at 103.
193
Id. at 117.
188
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194

tions. Since development plans often are flexible, governments are
inclined to use this flexibility in a manner that “minimize[s] subjective losses,” and they often achieve this by utilizing alternate parcels
of land—frequently, parcels of land belong to non-religiously affili195
ated owners.
Inevitably, politics have a strong influence over a government’s
decision to exercise its eminent domain power over religious prop196
Garnett maintains that governments often opt not to take reerty.
ligious property for fear of the political fallout resulting from bad
197
Increasingly, relipublicity and the inevitable holdout situation.
gious institutions are able to considerably influence local politics and
198
Some commentaland use decision-making in their communities.
tors even suggest that the political process effectively polices the gov199
Strikingly, “[a]
ernment’s exercise of its eminent domain power.
similar assumption is reflected in the Supreme Court’s deferential
public use review: the court assumes that the political process is better equipped than the judiciary to determine when an exercise of
200
Concerns for poeminent domain will serve the public interest.”
tential Establishment Clause violations underlie the ever-present tension between the numerous societal benefits that religious institutions
offer and the tremendous political influence such organizations have
201
in the community. Even without RLUIPA, many local governments
grant religious institutions land use exemptions and cater to the or202
ganizations’ interests in growth and development plans.
In addition, it has been asserted that the political power of some
religious institutions can influence the government’s exercise of emi203
nent domain. Thus, while religious institutions are usually the most
vulnerable targets for eminent domain actions, they are not always at
the losing end of the proceedings. A government will often take private land by its power of eminent domain and subsequently transfer
194

Id. at 111.
Id.
196
Id. at 117.
197
See Garnett, supra note 192, at 104.
198
Nicholas William Haddad, Public Use or Private Benefit? The Post-Kelo Intersection
of Religious Land Use and the Public Use Doctrine, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1131 (2006)
(discussing influence of Camden Churches Organized for People, a nonprofit group,
over Camden’s redevelopment during the fiscal crisis of 2001).
199
See Garnett, supra note 192, at 115.
200
Id.
201
See Haddad, supra note 198, at 1132.
202
Id. at 1133.
203
See Garnett, supra note 192.
195
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204

that land to religious organizations.
Moreover, “[p]owerful . . . religious institutions . . . can use eminent domain to dominate land use
205
decision making in areas populated by the politically vulnerable.”
Given this possibility, citizens in the aforementioned areas may actually be in favor of applying RLUIPA to eminent domain actions.
Heightened judicial scrutiny of condemnation proceedings—namely
by the application of RLUIPA—may be an effective means to “ensure
that public benefits indeed flow from a challenged condemnation,
thus reducing the potential for religious interests to dominate land
use decision making while still permitting the public to continue to
206
Thus, even
benefit from the services offered by such interests.”
though religious institutions are often the most vulnerable targets of
eminent domain actions, there may be some situations where the citizens—not the religious institutions—would most benefit from
RLUIPA’s application to condemnation proceedings.
D. Heightened Level of Scrutiny Regardless
Ultimately, advocates of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings desire such a result for the sole purpose of subjecting governments to a strict scrutiny analysis when they attempt to
condemn religious property. Generally, they are advocating for a
higher level of scrutiny to be applied to eminent domain proceedings
that burden religious institutions. In determining the constitutionality of condemnation proceedings under the Free Exercise Clause, it is
held that government actions, such as eminent domain proceedings,
207
that openly discriminate against religious uses are unconstitutional.
On the other hand, eminent domain actions that incidentally affect
religious uses will only face a strict scrutiny analysis if they are indi208
It is asserted by some that since eminent
vidualized assessments.
domain actions almost always require individualized determinations,
209
they are not “generally applicable laws” and will therefore be sub210
If
ject to strict scrutiny review regardless of RLUIPA’s application.
the government actions do not involve individualized assessments,
then they are generally applicable laws and will only be subject to a
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Haddad, supra note 198, at 1108.
Id. at 1141–42.
See id. at 1142.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
See id.
See id. at 886.
See Saxer, supra note 140, at 678–80.
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rational basis test. These laws of general applicability will easily pass
211
rational basis review and will continue to burden religious practice.
Coincidentally, most land use regulations that burden religious exercise do not fall under Smith’s “neutral laws of general applicability”
212
category either, and accordingly are subject to strict scrutiny review.
Because of the First Amendment, land use regulations that burden
religious exercise are usually subject to the heightened level of review
that RLUIPA seeks to provide anyway, and eminent domain proceedings—because of the constitutionally mandated individualized nature
of the assessment—are also indirectly subject to a RLUIPA-like level
of review. Consequently, this begs the question of the actual necessity
of RLUIPA in the face of First Amendment protections.
E. State Evasion of RLUIPA
It is worth noting that a government may evade the preemptive
force of RLUIPA by changing or eliminating the practice or policy
213
that leads to the substantial burden on the religious institution.
Moreover, the local government can argue that any burden on the
exercise of religion imposed through the exploitation of their eminent domain power will be eliminated by the just compensation pay214
ment. Nevertheless, this type of argument might fail because there
are likely burdens that may not be undone or outweighed by a monetary figure. It is contended that “one reason why condemnation actions should receive a higher level of scrutiny than typical land use
regulations . . . [is] the opportunity for government abuse, by paying
just compensation to force the sale of citizen’s free speech or free
215
exercise rights, is so great.” It cannot be forgotten that a high constitutional standard still must be met for an eminent domain proceeding to be valid, regardless of whether or not such actions are subject to additional scrutiny under RLUIPA.
The decision to not apply RLUIPA to eminent domain is fraught
with negative implications for the religious community. The power of
religious institutions is slight compared to the power of the government, and such a power differential will be especially detrimental in
the eminent domain context because of religion’s irreplaceable benefit to society. RLUIPA was enacted to ward off possible attacks against
religious institutions for their choice of land use, yet the failure to
211
212
213
214
215

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–85.
See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 949.
See Saxer, supra note 140, at 673.
Id.
Id. at 674.

SCADUTO_FINALV3

856

4/11/2008 11:15:59 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:823

protect religious institutions from the government’s power of eminent domain, that freedom of choice can be more easily taken away.
V. WHERE IS THE RLUIPA/EMINENT DOMAIN RELATIONSHIP GOING?
Inevitably, the debate over RLUIPA’s application to eminent
domain proceedings will continue until the Supreme Court rules definitively on the subject. In the meantime, some politicians suggest
that amending RLUIPA to explicitly include eminent domain within
216
the definition of land use regulation would be beneficial. It is questionable whether a proposed amendment to the Act would even pass
constitutional muster. The proposed amendment would dramatically
alter the rational review standard set forth in Kelo for assessing exercises of eminent domain power under the Takings Clause as it would
replace the rational review standard with RLUIPA strict scrutiny re217
The Court has already rejected a congressional attempt to
view.
change the standard of review for Takings Clause controversies, finding that “it [could not] unilaterally determine the constitutional
standard under the Takings Clause, without transgressing the separa218
tion of powers: That standard is for the Supreme Court to set.”
Such an amendment also likely violates the Establishment Clause because it would give religious institutions extraordinary protection
against takings but not provide other landowners with the same bene219
fit.
Additionally, some politicians have suggested that Congress hold
legislative hearings to determine the appropriate direction in which
to focus this discussion and to brainstorm about possible solutions to
the existing dilemma. It is argued that constituents might want to
inform members of Congress about the actual influence and impact
of RLUIPA, namely “the fact that it has created an aristocracy of
landowners—those that are religious—which has disserved many pri220
Considering the judicial split over
vate property owners.”
RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings and the slowly
budding commentary on the issue, it seems that the controversial
216

Senator Edward Kennedy has proposed an amendment to RLUIPA. See Eminent Domain Watch, Churches and Eminent Domain: A Move in Congress to Once Again
Make Churches Privileged Landowners, http://www.iconworldwide.com/emdo/
churches-and-eminent-domain-move-in.htm.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
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RLUIPA/eminent domain relationship will not terminate anytime
soon. Because it is unknown where the relationship is heading, as for
now, the future of the relationship remains open-ended and waiting
for the taking.
VI. CONCLUSION
The government is on a slippery slope when it begins doling out
privileges based on religious affiliations. Allowing religion to trump
every land use claim would be tyrannical. An unofficial backyard bur221
ial site could end up blocking the construction of a major freeway.
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor articulated in a 1988 opinion, “government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
222
Arguing the unfairness of a
citizen’s religious needs and desires.”
church receiving special protection from the government’s taking of
its land simply because the gravesites present are believed to be sacred, while a mom-and-pop pizza restaurant would not be accorded a
similar level of protection even though the government’s action
would incontestably destroy the restaurant’s business, Eric Zorn contends that “[w]hen the harms people merely believe in have greater
standing than the harms people can actually prove, government has
lost its neutrality in matters of faith, and genuine religious freedom
223
again sails out the window.”
The debate is just beginning over RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain actions. Proposing that eminent domain proceedings
are not per se land use regulations within the scope of RLUIPA, but
could likely be found to be in the implementation of a land use regulation under RLUIPA, this Comment recommends a middle approach to the issue that seems most equitable to both religious institutions and the government. This Comment suggests that allowing
takings to fit within RLUIPA’s scope only if they are found to be in
the implementation of a land use regulation is a sophisticated solution to the problem currently facing state governments and religious
institutions. If such a position is accepted, the danger to the livelihood of religious institutions and the security of their sacred burial
sites will not be as acute and the government’s power to exercise their
condemnation right will not be incorrectly usurped.

221

Change of Subject—The Chicago Tribune, Cemetery Fight at O’Hare, continued,
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2006/04/cemetery_fight
_.html (posted by Eric Zorn Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Cemetary Fight].
222
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
223
Cemetery Fight, supra note 221.

